

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 AID-05 IGA-02 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-07 MC-02

ACDA-05 SAJ-01 /076 W

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O R 291411Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2212

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO EUCOM

CINSUSAFE

JCS WASHDC

CSA WASHDC

CSAF WASHDC

CMC WASHDC

CNO WASHDC

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 0762

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, TU

SUBJECT: FY 77 MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE

REF STATE 17370 DTG 230432 JAN 76

1. THE FOLLOWING PRIORITY LIST OF GRANT AID MATERIAL IS IN RESPONSE TO PARAGRAPH FIVE OF REFTEL AND IS THE SAME AS CONTAINED IN THE FY77-81 PROGRAM OBJECTIVES MEMORANDUM (POM), EXCEPT FOR THE HARPOON MISSILES.

PRIORITY I

TOW MISSILE SURFACE ATK 600	\$2,371,200
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TOW LAUNCHER M220A1 28	906,360
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NIKE MISSILE PARTS	1,020,000
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LAW M/2 5000	380,000
WRM (ALL SERVICES)	11,181,105
HARPOON MISSILE RGM-84 26	13,000,000

PRIORITY II

COMMO (AIR FORCE)	2,160,000
COMMO (ARMY)	3,999,191

PRIORITY III

OH-58 HELICOPTER 10	2,405,000
M577A1 CMD VEH 12	1,073,772
M106A1 MORT CARRIER 16	1,347,136

\$39,843,764

(NOTE: THE REMAINING \$4,056,236 IS PROGRAMMED FOR SUCH ITEMS AS SHIPYARD IMPROVEMENT, SHIP AND FIRE-FIGHTING EQUIPMENT, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR MAJOR ITEMS LISTED ABOVE.)

2. THE FOLLOWING ANSWERS ARE KEYED TO QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN PARA SIX OF REFTEL AND ONLY REFER TO FMS CREDIT:

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A. GOT WILL ACCEPT AND CONSUMMATE CREDIT INCLUDED IN FY77 MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. THE MAJOR REASON IS THAT GOT FORCES ARE EQUIPPED LARGELY WITH OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT WHICH IS BECOMING UNSUPPORTABLE AND REQUIRES MODERNIZATION. THE COST OF THIS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS SUCH (APPROXIMATELY \$2 BILLION OVER A SIX-YEAR PERIOD) THAT NOT ONLY IS US CREDIT REQUIRED BUT THE GOT WILL PROBABLY INCREASE US COMMERCIAL PURCHASES AND POSSIBLY THIRD COUNTRY CASH AND CREDIT PURCHASES AS WELL.

B. ITEM	\$ MILLION
WAR RESERVE MUNITIONS	25
IMPROVE ANTI TANK CAPABILITY (TOW MSL)	7
AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION AND ARMAMENT	91
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(F-5A/B, F-100D/F, T/TF-104G ATTRITION AIRCRAFT; F-5E/F & SPT)	
COMMAND AND CONTROL	21
SHIP SUPPORT	1
ARMY MOBILITY	2
OTHER SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (GENERATORS FIRE-FIGHTING EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ABOVE EQUIPMENT)	3

\$150M

(NOTE: THIS LIST ENCOMPASSES \$150M FMSCR ONLY. THIS PRIORITY LIST OF EQUIPMENT FOR GOT IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS PLANNED FOR FY77 TURKEY FMS CREDITS IN THE FY77-81 PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM (POM). THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PRIORITY LISTING STATED IN THE POM IS STILL VALID AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE COUNTRY TEAM. THE GOT, HOWEVER, HAS NOT PROVIDED AN UPDATE OF ITS PRIORITIES. WE WILL FORWARD TURKISH INPUT, IF ANY, WHEN RECEIVED.)

C. THE PROVISION OF CREDIT SUPPORTS THE MILITARY REQUIREMENT OUTLINED IN THE APPROVED FORCE OBJECTIVES IN THE JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE PLAN (JSOP) AND WILL MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TOWARD IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES.

(1) THIS IMPROVEMENT WILL ASSIST TURKEY TOWARD ACHIEVING US/TURKISH GOALS OF SELF-DEFENSE AND SELF-RELIANCE, BOTH OF WHICH ARE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE US. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY AS A BARRIER TO THE EXTENSION OF SOVIET CONTROL AND AS A STAGING AREA FOR NATO OPERATIONS CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED. IT IS IN THE US INTEREST THAT ACCESS TO TURKEY'S STRATEGIC TRANSPORTATION ROUTES BE KEPT OPEN TO US AND DENIED TO BLOC USE.

(2) TURKEY IS FACED WITH A CONTINUALLY IMPROVING WARSAW PACT FORCE WHILE ITS OWN FORCES ARE FACING GROWING EQUIPMENT OBSOLESCENCE. TO MEET THIS THREAT AND FACILITATE MODERNIZATION OF ITS ARMED FORCES, IN ADDITION TO THE REGULAR DEFENSE BUDGET, THE GOT APPROVED FUNDING OF SOME \$2 BILLION FOR MODERNIZATION OVER A SIX YEAR PERIOD BEGINNING IN 1973. EVEN WITH THIS INCREASE IN SELF-FINANCED DEFENSE EXPENDITURE, CONTINUED EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE WILL BE REQUIRED IF TURKEY IS TO ACHIEVE THE FORCE MODERNIZATION NECESSARY

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UNILATERAL AND NATO SECURITY OBJECTIVES. MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT NOW IN THE GOT ARMED FORCES IS OPERATING WITH MARGINAL EFFECTIVENESS AND IS RAPIDLY BECOMING VERY COSTLY TO MAINTAIN AND IN MANY INSTANCES IS UNSUPPORTABLE DUE TO OBSOLESCENCE. THIS IS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT IN COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, TURKEY HAS SERIOUS SHORTAGES IN WAR RESERVE MUNITIONS AND HAS A LIMITED AMMUNITION PRODUCTION CAPABILITY. ACCORDINGLY, TURKEY WILL NOT MEET THE NATO OBJECTIVE OF 30 DAYS SUPPLY BY 1980. THE COST OF MAJOR PROGRAM PRIORITY ITEMS LISTED IN THE FY77-81 POM IS APPROXIMATELY \$1.1 BILLION. THIS PROGRAM REPRESENTS THE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO MEET THE INTERMEDIATE US APPROVED FORCE OBJECTIVES FOR TURKEY. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY SHOULD CONTINUE AT LEVELS PROJECTED TO PROVIDE FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES.

D. THERE ARE THREE ADDITIONAL IMPORTANT MILITARY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
FMS CREDIT FOR TURKEY:

(1) IF US CREDIT IS NOT FORTHCOMING AND IF OTHER NATO COUNTRIES
DO NOT MAKE UP THE SHORTFALL (AS APPEARS LIKELY), TURKEY MIGHT WELL
REVISE ITS COMMITMENT TO NATO. THE MILITARY COSTS TO NATO OF EVEN
A PARTIAL TURKISH WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE IMMENSE.

2) THE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING SITES (AND TO A LESSER EXTENT CERTAIN
OTHER US FACILITIES) IN TURKEY CONTINUE TO BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
TO US INTERESTS. US REFUSAL OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY
LEAD TO THE GOVT TO CONTINUE TO DENY THE USG USE OF THESE INSTALLATIONS.

(3) FMS CREDIT WILL ALSO HELP TO PREVENT A CHANGE IN EXISTING ARMS
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE WHICH COULD LEAD TO INSTABILITY IN
THE REGION. THE CONTINUATION OF THE PARTIAL ARMS EMBARGO HAS CAUSED
A DETERIORATION IN THE READINESS OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES, VIS-A-
VIS THAT OF THEIR GREEK NEIGHBORS. INDICATIONS THAT THIS DETERIOR-
ATION IS NOT BEING CORRECTED WOULD MAGNIFY TURKISH SENSITIVITY TO
ANY REAL OR IMAGINED THREAT FROM THEIR NEIGHBORS AND INCREASE
THE RISK OF AN ARMED CLASH BETWEEN THESE TWO COUNTRIES, WHICH

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WOULD BE COUNTER TO NATO AND US INTERESTS.

E. THE TWO PROGRAMS COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER. BOTH GRANT AND CREDIT PROGRAMS ARE USED TO MEET FORCE GOAL REQUIREMENTS AND BOTH ARE PROGRAMMED IN THE JSOP. THE MAJORITY OF GRANT AID AND FMS CREDIT IS USED FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE INVESTMENTS. IN THE PAST ALL TRAINING HAS BEEN GRANT AID OR COMMERCIAL. TURKEY IS SHIFTING FROM GRANT AID TO FMS CREDIT AS RAPIDLY AS ITS RESOURCES WILL ALLOW. THE RECENT EMBARGO, HOWEVER, INTERRUPTED THIS LONG-TERM TREND AND SERIOUSLY DAMAGED TURKISH ARMED FORCES CAPABILITIES AND OPERATIONAL READINESS. GRANT AID IS NEEDED TO RESTORE TURKISH FORCES TO OPERATIONAL READINESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

F. FULL RESUMPTION OF AN FMS CREDIT PROGRAM CAN HELP

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RESTORE THE MUTUAL TRUST WHICH FORMED THE BASIS OF US-TURKISH SECURITY RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE ARMS EMBARGO.

(1) OUR ACCESS TO AND USE OF SEVERAL KEY INSTALLATIONS AS WELL AS ANY LEVERAGE WE MIGHT HAVE WITH THE GOT TO INFLUENCE THE RESOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS HINGES ON THE STRENGTH AND CLOSENESS OF THE US-TURKISH PARTNERSHIP. OUR FIRST PRIORITY AND PRINCIPAL JUSTIFICATION FOR CREDIT PROGRAM FOR TURKEY IS RECONSTRUCTING AS MUCH OF OUR FORMER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE TURKISH NATION AS POSSIBLE. US WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE CREDIT FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES FOR WHICH TURKEY HAS A LEGITIMATE NEED IS AN ESSENTIAL LINK IN REFORGING THE CHAIN OF CLOSE US-TURKISH COOPERATION.

(2) TURKEY, BY VIRTUE OF ITS LOCATION, HAS THE PIVOTAL ROLE WITHIN BOTH NATO AND CENTO, OF PREVENTING SOVIET EXPANSION INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL, THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA, AND THENCE THE INDIAN OCEAN. BLOCKING OR REDUCING SOVIET INFLUENCE AND DENYING THE SOVIETS THE CRITICAL JUNCTURE OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD ARE VITAL US STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, AND THESE OBJECTIVES COINCIDE WITH TURKISH NATIONAL OBJECTIVES. TURKEY CANNOT NOW NOR IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE PROVIDE ALL OF THE RESOURCES NEEDED TO MEET THESE OBJECTIVES. IN ACCORD WITH US "TOTAL FORCE" POLICY, SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE DETERRENT CAPABILITY WHICH WILL MAINTAIN THE CRITICAL US INTERESTS IN THIS

REGION.

G. THE CREDIT SALE OF ARMS TO GOT WILL NOT APPRECIABLY EFFECT THE EXISTING REGIONAL ARMS BALANCE AS LONG AS IT IS KEPT IN A REASONABLE RATIO WITH SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE. ASSUMING THAT GREECE AND TURKEY SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND THAT GREECE RESUMES ITS NATO MILITARY COMMITMENT, CREDIT SALES TO BOTH COUNTRIES WILL ULTIMATELY CONTRIBUTE TO A STRENGTHENED NATO SOUTHERN FLANK. IF THE CREDIT SALES OF SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT AND REPAIR PARTS ARE NOT FORTHCOMING, TURKEY'S ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF WILL DETERIORATE RAPIDLY. THIS COULD RESULT IN THE GOT ELECTING TO MAKE DRASTIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ADJUSTMENTS WHICH WOULD DIVERT SCARCE RESOURCES FROM OTHER NATIONAL PROGRAM OR ITS SEEKING
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ALTERNATIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD NOT BE IN THE USG INTEREST.

H. THERE IS A DEMONSTRABLE NEED FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY. A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE MILITARY FORCE REQUIREMENTS AS PRESENTED IN THE FY78-85 JSOP AND GOT'S ABILITY TO PAY CASH TO OBTAIN THE REQUIRED FORCES CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THAT GOT WILL REQUIRE EXTERNAL CREDITS. EVENTS DURING THE PAST YEAR INDICATE THAT ADEQUATE CREDITS WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING FROM OTHER NATO ALLIES. IN ADDITION, SOME OF THE EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR MODERNIZATION IS NOT AVAILABLE FROM THIRD COUNTRY SOURCES AND MUST BE PROCURED FROM THE US. RESORTING TO A THIRD COUNTRY FOR MATERIAL WOULD INCREASE COST AND COULD RESULT IN A LACK OF INTER-CHANGEABILITY AND STANDARDIZATION OF EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS.

I. TURKEY IS FACING AN INCREASEINGLY HEAVY FOREIGN CREDIT PAYMENT BURDEN BUT THE PROPOSED CREDIT N ITSELF WILL NOT PRODUCE EXCESSIVE CLAIMS ON FUTURE BUDGETS OR OTHERWISE INTERFERE WITH TURKEY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

(1) HER RESOURCES GAP-- THE EXCESS OF DEMAND FOR FOREIGN GOODS OVER THE ABILITY TO PAY FOR THOSE GOODS WITH EXPORT EARNINGS-- HAS BEEN WIDENING STEADILY OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS. THE EFFECTS OF THIS TREND UNTIL RECENTLY HAVE BEEN CUSHIONED BY A FAIRLY COMFORTABLE LEVEL OF CONVERTIBLE FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES AND A HIGH LEVEL OF REMITTANCES FROM TURKISH WORKERS ABROAD. BUT WHEN FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES FELL RAPIDLY EARILER LAST YEAR, TURKEY TURNED TO HEAVY MEDIUM AND SHORT-TERM BORROWING AND DREW ON THE IMF OIL FACILITY TO PREVENT A FURTHER DETERIORATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES. TURKEY, THEREFORE, HAS BEEN BUILDING UP AN ADDITIONAL MEDIUM-TERM FOREIGN DEBT BURDEN AT FAIRLY HARD TERMS THAT WILL OBVIOUSLY AGRAVATE HER DEBT SERVICING

PROBLEM AND POSSIBLY HER GENERAL ECONOMIC CONDITION, ALL OTHER FACTORS REMAINING RELATIVELY EQUAL. THIS WOULD BE TRUE EVEN IF THERE WERE TO BE NO FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN FOREIGN DEBT.

(2) DESPITE THE SOMEWHAT GLOOMY MEDIUM-TERM FOREIGN DEBT OUTLOOK, THE GOT SEES ITS MILITARY EQUIPMENT NEEDS AS
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PRESSING AND WILL SPEND AS NECESSARY TO MEET THESE NEEDS EVEN AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER EQUALLY PRESSING ECONOMIC DEMANDS. BY RECONFIRMING AND ACCELERATING ITS \$2 BILLION PLUS REMODERNIZATION PROGRAM, GOT HAS DEMONSTRATED A DETERMINATION TO MODERNIZE ITS FORCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND A WILLINGNESS TO EXPEND THEREFORE A LARGE AMOUNT OF RESOURCES. THIS LARGE EXPENDITURE, WHICH IS BUDGETED OVER A SIX-YEAR PERIOD, COUPLED WITH OTHER RECENT GOT PROGRAMS WHICH INCREASE EXPEDITURES OR REDUCE REVENUE, RAISES A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER GOT WILL BE ABLE TO PURSUE ITS ECONOMIC AND DEFENSE OBJECTIVES WITHOUT ADOPTING A HIGHLY INFLATIONARY FINANCIAL POLICY. CREDIT OR AID FROM OTHER OUTSIDE SOURCES, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, COULD, HOWEVER, EASE THE ECONOMIC BURDEN ON THE GOT WHICH WOULD SPRING FROM FORCE MODERNIZATION.

J. IN ADDITION TO THOSE MAJOR ITEMS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH B ABOVE, ADDITIONAL PURCHASES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(1) COMMERCIAL SALES

AIM 7#-2 \$33 (M)
F-4 & RF-4 A/C \$230 (M)
HARPOON LAUNCHER \$ 12 (M)

(2) THIRD COUNTRY SALES

SUBMARINES (4) (FRG)
FAST TORPEDO BOATS (4) (FRG)
TORPEDOS \$3 (M) (FRG)

OTHER POTENTIAL THIRD COUNTRY PURCHASES ARE F-104S AIRCRAFT, HELICOPTERS, ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, AND ARMORED CARS FROM ITALY; AIRCRAFT, ARMORED CARS, TANKS, AMMUNITION, AND REPAIR PARTS FROM GERMANY; AND AIRCRAFT, HELICOPTERS AND SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES FROM FRANCE. AS A RESULT OF THE CYPRUS OPERATIONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT SUSPENSION OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE, THE FRG BRIEFLY SUSPENDED ITS MILITARY AID PROGRAM TO TURKEY. AT THE TIME OF THE FRG SUSPENSION, THE EIGHTH TRANCHE VALUED AT 100 MILLION DM HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED. IT IS NOW BEING COMPLETED WITH APPROXIMATELY 20 MILLION DM IN EQUIPMENT REMAINING TO BE DELIVERED. SUPPORT WITHIN FRG FOR THE 100 MILLION DM NINTH

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TRANCHE WHICH SHOULD HAVE STARTED 1 JANUARY 1976, HAS
WEAKENED WITHIN FRG. CURRENTLY THE FRG MOD IS CONFRONTED
WITH A PROPOSAL IN PARLIAMENT WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE AMOUNT
OF NEW EQUIPMENT IN THE TRANCH FROM THE PRESENT 80 PERCENT
TO 50 PERCENT. THE REMAINING 50 PERCENT WOULD BE FOR
SERVICEABLE SURPLUS ITEMS.
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